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Abduction: The Logic of
Discovery of Grounded Theory
Ja Reichertz
We deCided to wnte a book about methods In the mld-1960s We feit that changes were In
the air and wanted to wnte lor the new generatlon-the people over 30 were already too
bound by conventlon. Barney was more positive about the proJec1. I was more sceptlCal
because I was older. The tlUe ",dlCates what was Important to us The Discovery of Grounded
Theory (1967): unlike the usual method books which are concerned wlth venllCatlon.
we were more Interested In the dlscovery of theory 'out 01 the data' Grounded Theory 15
not a theory but a methodology to discover theories dormant In the data' (LegewIe &
Schervler-Legewle, 2004).'
Grounded lheory (GT), which Anselm Strauss refers lo here in an interview
decades later, is one of the most successful melhods ever developed and has
added a more qualitative note to social research. Thi is, however, not a result
of the c1arity and simplicity of this method established by Bamey Gla er and
An elm Slrauss but is rather due to the fact that it counteracts the common
prejudice, which is to ome extent entertained in science, lhal theorie quasi
emerge by themselves from the data (without any previous theoretical input).
According to thi belief, one only has to evoke the theory inherent in the data by
means of suitable methods, the theory would then become apparent without the
aclive actions of scientisls. The theories are thus believed lo emerge slowly in a
proces of gradual abstraction from the data. Therefore, one of lhe most famous
quotations from The DiscOl'ery o/Grollllded Theory i the following: 'Clearly, a
grounded lheory that is faithful to the everyday realities of the sub tantive area is
one that has been carefully induced from the data' (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 239).
The incorrectness of such an inductive procedure has already been proven by
 LOGIC OF DISCOVERY OF GROUNDEO THEORY 215 216 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GROUNDEO THEORY
Popper in general and. with respect to GT. by Kelle (1994,2005) and by Strübing
(2004: Chapter 27) in particular. Many users 01' GT therefore regard this
approach as an inductive method and are 01' the opinion, 'that the approach signals
a retum 10 simple "Baconian" inductivism' (Haig, 1995: 2). Representative for
many others, here is an example from Qualitatil'e Research ill Soeiology: Grounded
Theory 'is known as an inductive or ground-up approach to data analysis'
(Marvasti, 2004: 84). At first the two founders ofGTshared this view: 'From its
beginnings the methodology 01' Grounded Theory has suffered from an "induc-
tivist seil' misunderstanding" entailed by some parts 01' the Discovery book.
Although this inductivism plays a limited role in research work 01' many
Grounded Theory studies (including those 01' the founding fathers) it has often
lead to confusion especially among novices who draw their basic methodological
knowledge from texl books' (Kelle 2005: Chapter 24).
The faci that original GT has split into two direclions (differing in the
emphasis on the meaning of prior theoretical knowledge for research) became
evident in Strauss's Qualitative Allalysis /or Soeial Seielllists (1987), and
certainly was c1ear in Basics 0/ Qualitative Research (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
In both texts it was argued that theoretical pre-knowledge nows inlo the data's
interpretation while Glaser insists that the codes and categories emerge directly
from the data. The differences were made public in Glaser (1992; see also
Glaser, 2002). The differences have been thc object 01' heated debates (Kelle,
1994; Kendall, 1999; Miller, 1999; Strübing, 2004) in the scientific literature
since then.
Tms later position found in both Strauss and Strauss and Corbin takes into
account that observation and the development of theory are necessarily always
already theory guided. 'Every type 01' inquiry rests on the asking 01' effective
questions' (Strauss & Corbin 1990: 73). Furthermore, it also allows for the fact
that scientists must be in a position to modify or even reject concepts during and
due 10 observation. With this logic of research. GT falls within the realm 01'
abductive research logic. either Strauss nor Strauss and Corbin have system-
atized this logic 01' abductive discovery. nor have they linked it to the consider-
ations 01' Charles S. Peirce, the foundcr 01' abduction. To an extent their work
can be read in olhcr ways.
This contribution aims to c10se this gap: The purpose 01' this chapter is to
examine whether the logic 01' later GT (Strauss from the 1980s onwards) is
actually abductive. This might contribute to a better understanding 01' the
nature of empirically GT construction. First. an adequate description of the
abductive logic following Peirce is needed and second. an assessmcnt is
required whether the GT 01' the later Strauss (together with Juliet Corbin) can
be reformulated with the ideas and notions 01' Peirce. Thus my thesis is that
GT was 10 a very small extent abductive from the start and became more and
more abductive in its later stage; at least in the work 01' Strauss. Thus
the Glaser-Strauss controversy can be characterized, at least in part, as one
between induction and abduction.
ABDUCTION: A RULE-GOVERNED WAY TO NEW KNOWLEDGE
Social researchers who take an interest in the nuctuation 01' their own profes-
sional vocabulary have been able, for more than two decades, to witness the
nourishing of a concept which is around 400 years old: it concerns the term
abductioll. The boom has been so significant that we sometimes hear talk 01' an
'abductive turn' (Bonfantini, 1988: Wirth. 1995). First introduced in 1597 by
Julius Pacius to translate the Aristotelian concept apagoge, abduction remained
quite unnoticed for almost three centuries. Jt was Peirce (1839-1914) who first
lOok it up and used it to denote the only truly knoll'ledge-extelldillg means 01'
inferencing (so he c1aimed) that would be categorically distinct from the normal
types 01' logical conclusion. namely deductioll and illductioll (1973. 1976, 1986.
1992). Several decades were to pass before Peirce's ideas were systematically
received and adopted (Anderson, 1995; Apel, 1967; Fann, 1970: Hanson, 1965:
Moore & Robin, 1964; Reichertz, 1991,2003; Tursman, 1987; Wartcnberg, 1971).
Today the term 'abduction' has become something 01' a byword within social
research (but not only there): educationislS. linguists. psychologists. psychoana-
Iysts, semioticians. theatre-scientists. theologians. criminologists. researchers in
artificial intelligence. and sociologists announce in their research reports that
their new discoveries are duc to abduction. The great success of abduction. in my
opinion. may be traced back to two particular features: first to its indefiniteness
and second to the misjudgment 01' the achicvcments of abduction that derive
from this. Frequently, the use 01' the idea 01' abduction has led many 01' ilS users
10 one particular hope, that 01' a 1'IIIe-gOl'el'lled and replicable production 01'
new and I'olid knowledge. This hope is found. above all, in artificial inteJligence
research and in a number of variants of qualitative social research (e.g. Chamiak &
McDermott, 1985; Hemker, 1986: Knorr, 1985; Kreppner, 1975).
These approaches have in common that they stress both the logical and also
the jmlO\,Qtil'e character of abduction. For abduction is no longer treated as a
traditional, classical means of drawing conc1usions. but as a new method that is
not yet incorporated into formal logic. However, it iso in every sense. a means
of inferencing. h is precisely in this quality of being a 'means-of-inferencing'
that wc find the secret charm 01' abduction: it is a logical inference (and thereby
reasonable and scientific), however it extends into the realm 01' profound insight
(and therefore generates ne" knowledge). The secret charm 01' abduction lies
straight in this kind of inference-being: abduction is sensible and scientific
as a form of inference, however it reaches 10 the sphere 01' deep insight and
new knowledge. Abduction is intended to help social research, or rather social
researchers. to be able to make new discoveries in a logically and methodologi-
caJly ordered way.
This hope, to be able to make new discoveries in a logically and methodolog-
icaJly ordered way, is directed against Reichenbach (1938) and Popper (1934)
who, by separating the logic 01' discovery from the logic of ju,tification. 'drove'
the first inlO the realm ofpsychology, and allowed only thc second into the realm
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of serious science. This separation should be reversed: the unfortunate disjunc-
tion of contexts of discovery and justification should be removed by means
of abduction. A rethinking of this kind promises a great deal: liberation from
the 'chance of a good idea' (Habermas. 1973: 147). and (it is hoped) 'synthetie
inferences Cl posferiori.'
Beeause of this hope many soeial seientists have treated, and still do treat,
abduetion as a magie formula: always applieable when the eognitive basis of
the proeess of seientilie diseovery is being investigated: 'The attempt to eharae-
terize the aet of the generating of hypothesis and subjective recognizing no
longer only than arbitrarily and not further analyzable but comprehend it in form
of the abduetive conclusion ean perhaps show the way in a direetion, whieh is in
the humanities well-known as hermeneutie proeedure of ercating knowledge'
(Kreppner 1975: 69). In my opinion, however, this hope is the result of a wide-
spread misunderstanding of Peiree's position with regard to the differenees
between 'hypothesis' and 'abduetion' as forms of inferenee. From the modern
point of view it is beyond question that, up to about 1898, Peiree combined
two very different forms of inference under the name of ·hypothesis.' When he
beeame aware of this unclear use of the term 'hypothesis,' he elaborated a clear
distinetion in his later philosophy between the two proeedures, and ealled the
one operation 'qualitative induction' and the other 'abduction' (für more detail
see Reichertz, 2003, also Eeo, 1981). Many social seientists. with referenee to
the achievemell/S of abduetion, rely on Peiree's later work (in my view wrongly),
but with referenee to its form and validit)', on his work on hypothesis. It is only
on the basis of this 'hybrid meaning' that they sueceed in designing a logical
operation which produces new knowledge in a rule-governed way.
DEDUCTION, QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE INDUCTION, ABDUCTION
The social order around which humans (often but not always) orient themselves in
their actions is constantly changing and is, moreover. 'sub-cullUrally fragmented.'
The different order(s) therefore possess only a localized validity and are contin-
ually and, sinee the advent of the 'modern,' with increasing rapidity being changed
by individuals who previously (up to a point) adhered to them (Eisenstadt, 2003;
Foueault, 2004). Moreover, both theform and the validity of this order are bound
to the meaning attributions and interpretations of the acting subjects. Social
science explanations of actions aim at the (re)eonstruction of the order that is
relevant to the acting subjects. Admittedly this kind of order can no longer be
derived from proven grand theories, first becallse these are, as a rule, not suffi-
ciently 'Iocal,' and second because they have frequently already been overtaken
by constant social change. ThllS, appropriate new views of the structure of social
order must constantly be generated. For this reason it is highly sensible to exam-
ine as c10sely as possible the life practiee that is to be understood, and (on the
basis of these data) to (re-)eonstruet the Ilew orders. It is obvious that the
examination must start from older views and so have same link to them.
lfwe are now to make a serious attempt, in (qualitative and quantitative) research,
to evaluate eolleeted data, in other words to typologize them aeeording to partieu-
lar features and orders of features, the question very soon arises of how we may
bring a little order to the chaos of the data. Tbis is only to a very small extent
a matter of work organizalion (sorting of data) and much more a question of how
the unmanageable variety of the data may be related to theories: either pre-existing
or still to be discovered. In this undertaking (if one pursues the ideas of Peiree)
we may, in ideal tenns, distinguish three procedures and, in what folIows, I shall
subdivide the second procedure into two sub-groups; not because there are funda-
mental differences between the two, but rather because in this way the difference
we have a1ready spoken of between abduetioll and hypothesis or qualitative illduc-
tioll ean be made clearer (for a fuller discussion of this, see Reichertz, 2003).
Subsumption
One type of data analysis eonsists of the proeedure of subsumptioll.
Subsumption proeeeds from an already known eontext of features, that is from a
familiar rule (e.g. all burg!ars who steal from a medieine ehest are drug addicts),
and seeks to find this general context in the data (e.g. the unknown burglar has
robbed the medieine ehest) in order to obtain knowledge about the individual
case (e.g. the unknown burglar is a drug addiet). The logical form of this intel-
lectual operation is that of deductioll: the single case in question is subordinated
to an already known rule. Here a tried and trusted order is applied to the new
case. New facts (conceming the ordering of the world) are not experieneed in
this way; we have deduced that the unknown burglar is a drug addict (knowledge
that may be quite useful to the police, if the rule is true). Deductions are
therefore tautological, they tell us nothing new. But deductions are not only
tautologiea! but also truth-collveyillg: if the rule offered for application is valid,
then the result of the application of the rule is also valid.
Generalizing
A second fonn of analysis consists of extending, or gelleralizillg, into an order
or rule the combinations of features that are found in the data material.
Proceeding from the observation that 'in the case of burglaries a, b, and e the
medieine ehest was robbed;' and the case-knowledge that 'Mr. Jones committed
burglaries a, b, and e,' the inference is drawn that 'Mr. Jones always robs the
medicine chest when he breaks in.' The logical form of this intelleclUal opera-
tion is that of quantitative induction. It transfers the quantitative properties of a
sampie to a totality, it 'extends' the single case into a rule. Quantitative induc-
tiolls therefore are equally tautologieal but not truth-conveying. The results of
this form of inferencing are merely probable.
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One particular variant of the inductive processing of data consists of assem-
bling certain qualitative features of the investigated sampie in such a way that
this combination of features resembles another (that is already available in the
repertoire of knowledge of the interacting community) in essential points. In this
case one can use the term that already exists for this combination to character-
ize one's 'own' form. The logical form of this operation is that of qualitative
induction. From the existence of certain qualitative features in a sampie it
implies the presence of other features (e.g. At the scene of a crime I see a partic-
ular set of clues. In very many respects these agree with the pattern of clues
associated with Mr. Iones. Conclusion: Iones is responsible for the elues). The
observed case (token) is an instance of a known order (type). To surnmarize: if
quantitative induction makes inferences about a totality from the quantitative
properties of a sampie, qualitative induction (in contrast) supplements the
observed features of a sampie with others that are not perceived. It is only in this
sense that this form of induction transcends the borders of experience, that is,
only the experience of the sampie in question. This inference only extends
knowledge to the extent that it proceeds from a limited selection to a larger
totality. Qualitative induction is not a valid but only a probable form of infer-
ence, although it does have the advantage of being capable of operationaJization
(albeit with difficulty). Qualitative induction is the basis of aJl scientific proce-
dures that find, in collected data, only new versions of what is aJready known.
Abduction
The third type of data processing (apparently similar, but in fact totaJly different)
consists of assembling or discovering, on the basis of an interpretation of
collected data, such combinations of features for which there is no appropriate
explanation or rule in the store of knowledge that already exists. This causes
surprise. Real surprise causes a genuine shock (and not only in Peirce's opinion)
and the search for the (new) explanation. Since no suitable 'type' can be found,
a new one must be invented or discovered by means of amental process. One
may achieve a discovery of this sort as a re ult of an intellectual process and,
if this happens, it takes place 'Iike lightning,' and the thought process 'is very
little hampered by logical rules' (Peirce, 1931-1935: Vol. V: 117). An order, or
a rule, in this procedure must therefore first be discovered or invented, and this
has to happen with the aid of intellectual effort. Something unintelligible is dis-
covered in the data and, on the basis of the mental design of a new rule, the rule
is discovered or invented and, simultaneously, it becomes clear what the case iso
The 10gicaJ form of this operation is that of abduction. Here one has decided
(with whatever degree of awareness and for whatever reason) no Jonger to
adhere to the conventional view of thing. This way of creating a new 'type' (the
relationship of a typical new combination of features) is a creative outcome
which engenders a new idea. This kind of association is not obligatory, and
is indeed rather risky. Abduction 'proceeds,' therefore, from a known quantity
(= result) to two unknowns (= rule and case). Abduction is therefore a cerebraJ
process, an intellectual act, amental leap, that brings together things which one
had never associated with one another: A cognitive logic of discovery.
TWO STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCING ABDUCTIONS
lf one is to take seriously what has been outlined above, one would have to come
to the conclusion (pessimistic though it might be for everyday scientific practice)
that abductive discovery of new things is dependent either on pure chance,
a benevolent God, a favorable evolution, or a particularly well-endowed brain.
Science as a systematic endeavor would, according to this definition, seem
doomed to failure. However, even if one cannotforce lightning to strike in an
algorithmically rule-governed way, could there perhaps be ways of proceeding
and precautions that would make it easier for the (intellectual) lightning to
strike? Even lightning is not entirely unexpected. To extend the metaphor, it
happens only as a consequence of a particular meteorological situation. In a
storm one can look for the oak tree or seek out the beeches or even go to the top
of the church tower. None of these steps will make it certain that lightning will
come and strike; but the likelihood is nonetheless very much greater than with
someone who only loves the sunlight, who always takes refuge in a cellar during
a storm, and who (if he does happen to find hirnself in a storm) always tries to
find out where the nearest lightning conductor iso In short, if discovery is truly
related to accidents, then one can either give accidents a chance or deny or
reduce the possibility.
Peirce himself cites two macro-strategies that are particularly well-suited to
'enticing' abductive processes or at least to creating a favorable c1imate for their
appearance. One can be derived from the story where Peirce talks retrospectively
about his talents as an amateur detective (Peirce, 1929). In this Peirce teils how,
during a voyage at sea, his overcoat and a valuable watch were stolen. He was
very alarmed, because the watch was not his own property. He therefore decided
to recover the watch, by any means and as quickly as possible. He had all the
crew called together and asked them to form up in a line. Then he walked along
the line and addressed a few apparently inconsequential words to each of them.
When I had gone through the row, I turned and walked Irom them, though not away, and
said to myself: 'Not the least sClntilia 01 light have I got to go upon'. But thereupon my other
seil (Ior our own communlngs are always in dialogues) said to me, 'but you simply must put
your linger on the man. No matter il you have no reason, you must say whom you think to
be the thle!'. I made a little loop in my walk, which had not taken aminute, and I turned
toward them, all shadow 01 doubt had vamshed (Peirce, 1929: 271).
Peirce named one person as the culprit and subsequently, after a great deal of
confusion (see Sebeok & Umiker-Sebeok, 1985 for a full description), it emerged
that the man suspected by Peirce was indeed the thief. The stimulus for this individ-
ual initiative in malters of 'detection' was therefore provided by fear: not the fear of
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losing the value of the wateh, bUI the fear of a 'Life-Iong professional disgraee'
(peITee, 1929: 270). When, after his first eonversations with the crew, he eould not
name a SUSpeel, he inereased, by an aet of will, his pressure 10 do something.
In this partially self-indueed emergeney situation, the abduetive lightning struck.
Of course, abductions cannot be forced by a specific procedural prograrn, but
one can induce situations (and this is the moral of this episode) in which abduc-
tions fit. According to Peifee, the presence of gerllline dOLibl or L1neertainly or
fear or great pressure 10 ael is a favorable 'weather situation' for abductive
lighlning 10 strike. Peifce, however, develops another possible way of creating
situations in whieh new knowledge may more frequently be oblained. For Ihis
to work the investigator, as Peirce advises, should let his mind wander with no
speeific goal. This mental game without rules he calls 'musement,' agame of
meditation, or daydfeaming. How one achieves the condition of daydrearning
may be seen in the following formulation:
Erter your skrff of musement, Dush off Into the lake of thought, and leave the breath of
heaven 10 swell yoursail. With yaur eyes open, awake 10 wrat is about or withln you, and
open c~nversatlon Wlth yourself: for such is all mechtation! C..) It is, however, not a conver.
saUon In words alone, but is illustrated, like a Jecture, wrth diagrams and with expenments
(Pe"ce, 1931-1935: Vol. 6, 315).
To do this requires leisure, thai is to say, freedom from an immediate pressure
10 aet is a fundamental eondition. without which the skiff will not be able to
embark. This apparently contradiets quite vehemently the precondilions for
suecessful abductions which Peirce sets out in his deteetion example.
Admittedly, the contradiction is resolved if one looks for what is typical in the
t\Vo 'abduction-friendly' settings. In both cases the procedures mean that the
eOllseiollsly 1V0rking milld, relying on logical rules, is outmaneuvered. Peiree-
lhe-detective allows no time for the calculating mind to busy itself with the
solution of his problem, and Peirce-the-daydreamer swilches off his power of
logical judgment by entrusting hirnself 10 the 'breath of heaven.'
All measures designed to ereate favorable conditions for abductions, there-
fore, always aim at one thing; the aehievement of an auiIL/de of preparedness to
abandon old convictions and to seek new ones. Abductive infereneing is not,
therefore, a mode 0/ reasollillg that delivers new knowledge, and neilher is it an
exael melhod that assists in the generation of logieally ordered (and therefore
operalionalizable) hypotheses or some new theory. Abductive inferencing is,
rather, an atlitude towards data and towards one's own knowledge: data are to
be taken seriously, and the validity of previously de-eloped knowledge is to be
queried. lt is astate of preparedness for being taken unprepared.
RESEARCH RESULTS: RECONSTRUCTION OR CONSTRUCTION?
Abduetive efforts seek some (new) order, but they do not aim at the eonstruetion
of allY order, but at the discovery of an order whieh filS the surprising facts;
or, more precisely, whieh solves the praetical problems that arise from these.
The justification for this seleetive attention (which targets a new order) is not
the greatest possible eloseness to reality or the highest possible rationality. The
justifieation is, above all, tbe L1se/L1lness whieh the 'type' that is developed brings
to lhe queslion of interest. It ean bring order and the means of linguistie repre-
sentation, however these new 'types' are indispensable 100ls if one is to be able
to make predietions about the future on the basis of a past that is hypothetieally
underslood because it is ordered: they are indispensable when it is a matter of
producing answers to the question of 'what to do next?' New orders, therefore,
are also always oriented lowards future action.
An abductive discovered order, therefore, is not a (pure) reflection of reality,
nor does it reduce reality to its most important components. Instead, the orders
obtained are menlal eonslmels with which one can live comfortably or less
comfortably. Abduction is something we all do, when there is a crisis or when
we do nOI know whal 10 do nexl. For many purposes, partieular construets are
of use, and for other purposes, different construets are helpful. For this reason,
the search for order is never definilively complele and is always undertaken
provisionally. So long as the new order is helpful in the completion of a task
it is allowed 10 remain in force: if its value is Iimited, distinctions musl be
made; if it shows itself to be useless, it is abandoned. In this sense, abductively
discovered orders are neither (preferred) eonstruetions nor (valid) reeonstrue-
tions, but IIsable (re-)constructions.
When faced with surprising facts, abduction leads us to look for meaning-
creating roles, for a possibly valid or fitting explanation that eliminales what is
surprising about the facIs. The end-point of this search is a (verbal) hypothesis.
Once this is found, a multi-stage process of checking begins. If the fITst step in
the process of seientific discovery consists of the finding of a hypothesis by
means of abduction, then the second step consists of the derivation 0/ predie-
lions from the hypothesis, which is deduction. and the third step consists of
the seareh tor /aels that will 'verify' the assumplions, which is induction. lf the
facts cannot be found the process begins again. and this is repeated as often as
necessary until 'fitting' facts are reached. With this definition Peiree designed a
three-stage discovery procedure consisting of abduction, deduetion, and induetion.
Finding and eheeldng are, in Peiree's opinion, IwO dislinct parts of a single
process of discovery or research. If the finding stage is largely a resull of a
conscious and systematic approach, ehecking takes plaee aeeording to opera-
tionalizable and rule-govemed standards that are controlled by reason. Certaillty
about the vaJidity of abductive inferences, however, cannot be achieved even if
one subjecls an abductively developed hypothesis 10 extensive tesling; that is to
say, deduces il from its consequences, then seeks to deterrnine these inductively.
and then repeats these Ihree steps many limes. Verifiealion in the striet sense of
the word cannot be done in this way. All that one ean aehieve, using lhis proce-
dUfe, is an intersubjectively eonstrueted and shared 'truth.' Ln Peiree's opinion even
this is only reaehed if all mernbers of a society have come to the same eon\'ielion.
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Since, in Peirce's work, 'alJ' includes even those who were born after us, the
process of checking can in principle never be completed. For Peifee, absolute
certainty can never be achieved so: 'infallibility in scientific matters seems to me
irresislibly comic' (Peirce, 1931-1935: Vol. I, X).
THE STRAUSS CONCEPT OF GT AND PEIRCE'S LOGIC OF RESEARCH
In early GT there were two strands, an inductive one, which worked on the
assumption that categories and even theories emerge out of the data if only one
looks c10sely enough, and a theorelical strand, which banked on the fact tbat
prior knowledge about the world and scientific theories (apart from the data) are
useful (cf. Kelle, 2(05). In the later variant of GT by Strauss and Strauss and
Corbin (in my further considerations I will only focus on this variant of GT), one
can find both strands, the inductive and the 'theoretical' one, but with reversed
emphasis. In the inductive variant by Glaser and Strauss. knowledge concepts or
theories were officially and explicitly founded on induction (while the theoreti-
cal strand worked in the background), and in the later variant by Strauss and
Corbin, theory was officially and explicitly founded on theoretical knowledge
(while the inductive strand worked in the background; Strübing, 2004: 50ff).
Strauss and Corbin have strongly emphasized this turn of their concept: 'Also,
researchers are still c1aming to use "grounded theory methods" because their
studies are "inductive'" (Strauss & Corbin, 1994: 276). Thoughtful reaction
against restrictive prior theories and theoretical models can be salutary, but too
rigid a conception of induction can lead 10 sterile ur boring stuuics. Ala:'l,
grounded theory has been used as a justification for such studies. This has
occurred as a result of the initial presentation of grounded theory in The
Discovery of Grollllded Theory that had led to a persistent and unfortunate mis-
understanding about what was being advocated. Because of the partly rhetorical
purpose of that book and the authors' emphasis on Ihe need for grounded theory,
Glaser and Strauss overplayed the inductive aspects (Strauss & Corbin, 1994:
277). Later GT claims to be more than a method for the coding of data. Even if
coding is an essential part of research for Strauss, GT doesn't exhaust itself in
coding (see Strübing 2006). Otherwise GT would run the risk of merely dou-
bling the data on a more abstract level. It is therefore very unfortunate if the later
GT is described as a coding paradigm. Strauss and Strauss and Corbin repeat-
edly pointed out that GT is 'a general methodology, a way of thinking about and
conceptualizing data' (Strauss & Corbin, 1994: 275). Thus GT helps scientists
to fulfill two tasks: the intellectual task of coding (open, axial, selective), and
the intellectual task of developing and redeveloping concepts and theories
while repeatedly moving to and fro between the collection of data, coding, and
memoing (Iogic of research).
Of decisive importance for the question whether later GT makes use of
abductive thinking' is therefore (a) whether it provides opportunities for the
emergence of abductive conclusions at the level of single thinking acts, i.e.
during concrete coding acts, or (b) whether the logic of research as a whole is
abductive or not. Thus the central issue is neither whether GT works abductively
in all cases and in all fields (this would be nonsense), nor whether one is allowed
to revert to knowledge apart from the data (this primarily pertains to qualitative
induction), but whether GT systematically counts on the appearance of new
codes or hypotheses. 'Abductive' here does not simply mean that the research
data is taken seriously and that the findings have to fit the data (!his must be
accomplished by all serious research) but essentially that the research is laid out
in such a way that new hypotheses can and do appear at every level. that the
interpretation of the data is not finalized at an early stage but that new codes,
categories, and theories can be developed and redeveloped if necessary. lf one
takes a c10ser look at the work of Strauss and Strauss and Corbin to see whether
there are methodical routines and practices within GT which favor the appear-
ance of new hypotheses, much evidence can be found.
Example (a): One passage is very c1ear as regards 'induction' as a basis of
coding. It here becomes apparent that Strauss doesn't mean the logical conclu-
sion 'induction' at all but rather all the actions and attitudes which lead to a
hypothesis, and exactly this is also addressed by Peirce with his considerations:
'Induction refers to the actions that lead to discovery of a hypothesis-that is,
having a hunch or an idea, then converting it into an hypothesis and assessing
whether it might provisionally work as at least a partial condition for a type
of event, act, relationship, strategy, etc.' (Strauss, 1987: II f).
Example (b): In Strauss's work, one can find repeated references at the level
of the research logic to a permanent testing of verdicts once taken. Data eleva-
tion, coding, and the making of memos are related to each other in a three-step
process: Hypotheses lists deduction of consequences and the testing of these
consequences by means of the data and data analysis. This exactly corresponds
to the logic of 'abductive' research: '(.. ) data colleclion leads quickly to coding,
which in turn may lead equally quickly, or at least soon, to memoing. Either will
then guide the searches for new data. Or they may lead directly to additional
coding or memoing. Or-please note!-they may lead to inspecting and coding
of already gathered (and perhaps already analyzed) data. That latter kind of
"return to the old data" can occur at any phase of the research, right down to
writing the last page of the final report of the theory' (Strauss, 1984: Unit I. 18).
Furtherrnore, recurring references to the necessity of not only relying on
existing knowledge but of creating new codes, categories, and theories can also
be found in the work of Strauss and Strauss and Corbin: 'Creativity is also a vital
component of the grounded theory method. Its procedures force the researcher
to break through assumptions and to create new order out of the old. Creativity
manifests itself in the ability of the researcher to aptly name categories; and
also to let the mind wander and make the free associalions that are necessary for
generating stimulaling questions and for coming up with a comparison that leads
to discovery' (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 27). The wording itself a\ready reveals
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how close the ideas of Strauss and Corbin and Peirce are. In other text passages
whlch refer to the nash-like discovery of the new, the common ground (including
the abstract agreement) hecomes still clearer; 'Yet, the most gratifying moments
of research tor analytically inclined researchers will be those that bear on
the~r dlscovenes. They may be mauers of quick nashes of "intuition," or major
breakthroughs m understandmg the meaning and patterns of events, or the
deeper satlsfacllon of having solved the research's major puzzles' (Strauss &
Corbm, 1990; 28).
In .Iater GT one can find (in addition to the coding and the development of
theones of a rruddle or long range) two intellectual operations; the finding of
slmilanty (coding in known codes) and the development of the new (ereating
new codes). Th,s kmd of sClentlfic work has its parallel in the distinction
bet~een quaJit3t.ive induc,tion and abduclion as made by Peirce. The operation,
the mtelleetual Jump whlch 'states' things in common hetween acquaintance
and data and codes malready known concepts is the first step; the qualitative
mductlOn (as executed above). This thinking act adds something to the data too.
The second step IS the mtellecrua! jump wbich adds something very new to the
data, somethmg that they do not contain and that does not already exist as a
concept or theory elther. This is abduction.
The quest ion whether GT (in the variant of Strauss and Corbin) contains an
abducllve research logic ean therefore be answered with a resounding 'yes.'
Fortunately, however, It does notonly contain the logic of abductive reasoning
but also that of quahtatlve mducllon. The logic of later GT thus permits abduc-
tlve reasonlng, counts .on it, enables it, grants it pIace. More is not neeessary.
One can, m conclusJOn, wonder why Strauss did not further develop the ideas
of Pelrce on abduction. Strauss undoubtedly knew the idea of abduction, hecause
he menlloned It In bis work al least once (cf Stru"bl'ng ?Q04' 51) I '
. . , - . . n connectIon
Wlth the question where our knowledge for induction. deduction, and verifi-
callon comes from, Strauss stated (and this is indeed an importam but not the
crucIDI detennlnam for the new variant of GT) that this knowledge is nurtured
by expenenee, but can also derive from theoretical pre-knowledge. 'They come
from expenence wuh th,s kind of phenomenon before-whether the experience
IS personal, or denves more "professionally" from actual exploratory research
mto thephenomenon of from the previous research program, or from theoretical
sensulvlty hecause of the researcher's knowledge of technical literature'
(Strauss, 1987; 12).
Straus~ adds in a foomote here; 'See the writings ofCharles Peiree, the American
Pragmal1st, whose concept of abduction strongly emphasized the crucial role of
expenence In the first phase of research operations' (Strauss, 1987; 12). For
Pelrce, the fact that mtellectual operations are nurtured by knowledge of every
~nd In th,e p,hase of dJscovery 1$ not decisive für detining abduction, however, it
IS of cruclallmportance, for hirn that new knowledge can be generated by means
of IhlS. operation. In Study Letters of the FernUniversität' in Qualitative
A1lalysls 111 SoclGl Research: Grou1lded Theory Methodology (Strauss, 1984),
the notion 'abduction' does not yet appear. In later documents, Strauss does
without the explicit idea of abduction. Why did Strauss not use this term before?
Did he not know it? As a pragmatist he would have had good reasons (and many
opportunities) to see the parallels hetween his way of coding (particularly the
open and seleetive coding) as weil as his type of generating theory by 'coherem
perception' and the abductive reasoning of Peirce.
Tbe following deduction might illuminate the sudden but brief appearance of
the word 'abduction' in the work of Strauss (which, if correct, is explained by
this surprising fact); Anselm Strauss becarne aequainted with pragmatism and its
research logic via Blumer via Dewey.' Strauss also mentions the innuence
of Peirce in some passages, but his notes are always very general. There is no
evidence that Strauss has systematically studied the writings of Peirce, but
Strauss's lack of citation 10 Peirce did not mean a lack of knowledge; he primarily
knew Peirce as an action theorist, asemiotist. and a logician, so that for hirn as
an empirist and 'working sociologist' in the tradition of the Cbicago School there
was no real need to look for notes in the work of Peirce as far as Ihe logic of
discovery is concerned. Strauss knew the concept of abduction from at least
1968 and when he got to know it he saw the paralleIs to his form of coding
and generating theories.' but he did not further expound on these paralleis. If he
saw the chance to build a methodological basis (as a general theory) for his GT
with the abductive research logic, he did not use it,' possibly because (due to
restricted time resources) he focused on convincing other researchers of the fer-
tility of its methodology and methods, rather than on coordinating its procedure
with the conceptualities of the dominant methodology and on fastening it against
criticism.
NOTES
1 Heiner legewie and Barbara Schervier-Legewle led the 1994 Interview wlth Anselm Strauss
Ten years later It was pubhshed In Forum Oualitative Sozialforschung
2 The Discovery of Grounded Theory contalns many consideratlons that point to an abduetlve
reasomng: 'The root sources of all slgmflcant theorizing is the senSitive Insights of the observer
hlmselL As everyone knO'NS, these can come In the morning or at night, suddenly or W1th s10w
dawnlng, whde at work or at play (even when asleep); furthermore, they can be denved directty
from the theory (one's own or someone else's) or occur Wlthout a theory; and they can strike the
observer while he is watchlng hirnself reaet as weil as when he is observlng others In actIon. Also,
his insights may appear Just as frUltfuUy near the end of a long InqUlry as near the oUßer (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967: 251).lnterestlngly, the authors dld not mentJOn Pelfce In thls passage but exphCJtly
referred to the secondary hterature 'Nature of Inslght' and '(reatJVe Work' in a footnote
3 '(ontnbutlng to its development were two streams of work and thought: first, the general
thrust of American Pragmatism (especially the wntings of John Dewey, but also those of George
Mead and (harIes Pelrce) and including its emphases on action and the problematlc Situation,
and the necesslty for conceivtng a method in the context of problem solvmg' (Strauss, 1987: 5). For
the history of grounded theory see: Kendall, 1999: 743f. In Strauss & (orbin, 1990, Pelrce IS no
longer menuoned when the influence of pragmatlsm is discussed (see Strauss & (orbin, 1990: 24)
4 An Insignlficant, but nonetheless interestlng, question is why Strauss used the term 'abductlon'
so many years later. My hypothesls IS that the term 'abductJon' (for a short time) found 115 way Into
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grounded theory methodology via Germany. The following reasons support th,s hypothesIs: a study
VISlt of Anselm Strauss to Germany fell In the time between Study Letters (wntten in 1982/1983
and published ,n 1984) and the publicatlon of Qualitative Analysis for Sodal Scientists (1987).
Dunng th,s study VISlt he exchanged thoughts (by ,nvltat,on of Hans-Georg Soeffner among others)
wlth the research teams of RlChard Grathoff (Unlverslty of Bleiefeld), Fntz Schütze (UniverSlly
of Kassel), and Hans-Georg Soeffner (FernUniversität Hagen). At that time, all of the above-
menlloned researchers (Grathoff, Schütze, and Soeffner) dealt wlth the features of abductlve
reasonlng. Hans-Georg Soeffner slill remembers having repeatedly menlloned Pelrce's notion of
abductlon to Strauss In connectlon wlth the possibilities of 'coherent perception' when codlng.
First, d,scuss,ons about the parallels of abductlon and Strauss's theory of research already took place
In 1981/1982 when Hans-Georg Soeffner was In San FranCISco (Hans-Georg Soeffner, personal
communlcallon In 12/2006; Strauss, 1987 XV)
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